报告题目：Finite Repeated Games with Learning of Actions（包含行动学习效应的有限重复博弈）

报告人：宋阳波(助理教授，香港中文大学深圳分校)

报告时间：2017年12月29日(周五) 下午13:15-14:30

报告地点：三教102

邀请部门：必发9988集团经济学系

主持人：杨剑侠

 

报告内容摘要：This paper studies finite repeated games in a novel setting: a player may learn new actions over time by observing the opponent's play. In contrast to related literature such as Kreps et al. (1982), we provide a framework with full rationality for sustaining cooperation, which bridges the gap between theories of finite and infinite repeated games. We show that even if rational cooperation is impossible without learning, for instance in a Prisoner's Dilemma, it can be sustained with approximate efficiency when players can learn from one another. Cooperation does not have to be endowed in each player's initial action set, but can be ``taught'' and enforced. When learning is imperfect, the set of sustainable payoffs is not continuous, in the sense that no equilibrium exists when learning is nearly perfect and the repeated games last for sufficiently many periods.

   

报告人简介： 宋阳波，经济学博士，现任香港中文大学深圳分校经济管理学院助理教授，2015年获美国加州大学洛杉矶分校 (University of California, Los Angeles) 经济学博士，曾于2015年7月-2016年4月期间在加州大学洛杉矶分校的社会学院从事博士后研究。主要的研究领域为网络经济学、机制设计与博弈论。近年来主要从事社会网络领域的网络形成、信息获取和社会学习等方面的理论研究。宋教授在经济理论的国际著名期刊发表论文若干篇，包括Journal of Economic Theory、Economic Theory等。