(1) Chen, Y., Jiao, Z., Qin, W., & Shan, J. (2023). Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure. Operations Research Letters, 51(6), 638-642.
(2) Chen, S., Chen, Y., & Hsu, C. L. (2023). New axioms for top trading cycles. Bulletin of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12393
(3) Chen, Y., Harless, P., & Jiao, Z. (2023). The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization. Review of Economic Design. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00329-7
(4) Chen, Y., Huang, Y., Jiao, Z., & Zhao, Y. (2022). A comparison study on responsiveness of three mechanisms to affirmative action in school choice. Operations Research Letters, 50(5), 488-494.
(5) Chen, Y., Jiao, Z., Zhang, Y., & Zhao, F. (2021). Resource allocation on the basis of priorities under multi-unit demand. Economics Letters, 202, 109814.
(6) Chen, Y., & Zhao, F. (2021). Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets. Economics Letters, 201, 109806.
(7) Chen, Y., & Jiao, Z. (2021). On the equivalence of the Boston and top trading cycles school choice mechanisms. Operations Research Letters, 49(3), 300-303.
(8) Chen, Y., Jiao, Z., Shen, Z., & Tian, G. (2019). Affirmative action under common school priorities: The top trading cycles mechanism case. Operations Research Letters, 47(3), 190-196.
(9) Chen, Y. (2017). New axioms for deferred acceptance. Social Choice and Welfare, 48, 393-408.
(10) Chen, Y. (2016). New axioms for immediate acceptance. Review of Economic Design, 20, 329-337.
(11) Chen, Y. (2014). When is the Boston mechanism strategy-proof?. Mathematical Social Sciences, 71, 43-45.